Causation or correlation?
Since I last blogged on things have not necessarily gone the Westminster government's way. But there is still that it struck an explicit trade-for-terrorism deal with Tripoli whereas it is clear that in its dealings with the Libyan dictatorship it regularly said that the release of the Lockerbie bomber was ultimately a matter for the Scottish executive in Edinburgh.
That said, and despite the on the matter, it is increasingly certain that the British government was hardly unhappy at the prospect of the bomber's return to his homeland, whether under a prisoner release agreement (under which London had included the bomber) or on compassionate grounds (the eventual basis of Edinburgh's decision to release him).
On Channel 4 News last night went as far as to say the British government had been "agitating" for his release but back-tracked somewhat when pushed to explain what that meant.
When asked if London had made it clear it wanted the bomber returned, he blinked furiously and never quite answered the question. But there is now plenty of evidence to suggest that Edinburgh knew there would be no resistance from London should the Scottish executive decide to release him.
For a start we now know from letters sent to by that the British government went in the space of several months in 2007 from excluding the Lockerbie bomber from its prisoner release agreement with Tripoli to including him.
Co-incidentally, as the government was holding out against including al Megrahi, BP's oil exploration deal with Tripoli was running into the ground. Within six weeks of Straw backing down, the BP deal was back on track again.
Causation or correlation? You decide. What we do know is that Straw justified his u-turn on the basis of London's "wider negotiations" with Tripoli, which were largely about trade and investment, and claimed to Edinburgh in December of 2007 that it was in the "overwhelming interests" of the UK not to exclude al Megrahi (whereas in July he had been insisting on his exclusion).
This is not quite trade-for-terrorism but it is hard not conclude that British ministers knew their growing rapprochement with Tripoli was likely to hit the buffers unless the al Megrahi matter was addressed. London might always have made it clear it was really a matter for Edinburgh -- but from sometime in the second half of 2007 it also let Tripoli know that London would not stand in the way of his return.
So Edinburgh knew it was pushing at an open door in London if it sent the bomber back.
And both capitals had to deal with growing threats from Libya. We now know from that Tripoli's Minister for Europe warned London and Edinburgh that there would be "catastrophic" implications for UK-Libya relations if al Megrahi died in his Scottish prison.
British business was also feeling the heat: as a result of threats from Tripoli those trying to enter the Libyan market also warned ministers on both sides of the border of their "grave concern" should the bomber not be released.
So the pressure was on Edinburgh and London to release him. The Scottish government has made much of its ; but it was also being threatened by Libya to do so. It was told twice (at end of 2008 and the start of this year) by a Libyan minister that that if he died in Scotland it would be "bad" and a "major problem". The Scottish media has started carrying stories that Justice Minister MacAskill feared terrorist attacks on Scottish soil if the bomber died in his Greenock jail.
The London government continued to tell Tripoli that his release was not a matter for British ministers but these ministers by now were also saying they didn't want al Megrahi to die in jail either. Junior Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell even told the Tripoli government that neither the Prime Minister nor Foreign Secretary wanted Megrahi "to pass away in prison".
The Foreign Secretary confirmed this on the Ö÷²¥´óÐã this morning, though refined it by saying that the British government was not "actively seeking" his death in prison. How you "actively seek" somebody's death in prison is not clear. But reasonable people will conclude that the British government was indicating to Tripoli that it would not oppose any decision to send him back. London had already indicated the same to Edinburgh.
The reason why the London government is being circumspect on this is that failing to oppose al Megrahi's return flew in the face of an undertaking given by then Foreign to the American government in 1998-99, which explicitly stated that anybody found guilty of the would serve their whole sentence in Scotland as a matter "of principle".
So where are we now, as the ? Still with a lot to find out and with a political row likely to go all the way into the party conference season and beyond.
But neutral observers might already have come to two initial conclusions: the Scottish government's decision to return al Megrahi might not have been quite as principled as it has made out; and the British government was not quite as neutral (or disinterested) in the decision as it has made out.
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