



should run an immediate resolution, quite a tough one, both condemning the act of 11 September and specifying that there was a right of self defence in the UN charter which could be activated in these circumstances, and it passed without a murmur through the security council later that morning. There was a general assembly resolution in the same sense, so that every single member of the United Nations, not just 15 on the Security Council, had voted for a resolution condemning the act, and that is quick in UN terms.

STOURTON: And how much debate, if any, was there about the question of whether self defence was the appropriate way to look at it, were there people saying hang on, this is something that ought to come to the United Nations, that ought to have the rubber stamp of a resolution before actual military action is taken at that stage.

GREENSTOCK: No. I mean you would expect in normal UN circumstances there to be quite careful examination of a text like that, which might seem to open up legal precedence and et cetera, and there are members of the Security Council who would be fairly precise in their approach. The shock was great in the whole international community, and the sense of sympathy with New York and the United Nations in what had happened just down there, just out of sight behind the buildings was an influence on people, and nobody was prepared to argue this out, and there was no real debate about the appositeness of that particular approach.

STOURTON: Do you think people realised, as you obviously did, that America would respond in kind before they realised what they were signing up to.

GREENSTOCK: Yes I think so; they knew it would be inevitable. In fact, there was an expectation in the air that the Americans would launch something within 24 hours, and if you remember, that night in Afghanistan, the northern alliance threw some stuff at the Taleban in Kabul, and the sky was lit up with some weapons falling at night, it was on CNN at the time, and our first thought was blimey they've started within 18 hours, but it proved not to be the case, and the fact that that could have been the United States reacting didn't really get a murmur from around the international community here.

STOURTON: The next resolution or the more detailed was I think on the 28th of that month. What happened between the 9th and the 28th here, what kind of diplomatic activity was going on?

GREENSTOCK: Well there was I think an immediate focus on whether the United States was going to act under the resolutions that passed on 12th September, and then when we realised that the American response was going to be quite considered, there began to be a discussion of whether it would be possible to get a detailed resolution through the United Nations. Normally a smaller number than 15 members of the Security Council get together and exchange views on this, we, the French and the Americans were talking to each other the whole time. I remember talking to London about this, David Manning the prime minister's adviser on international and national security affairs, and I had a conversation on the telephone about whether it would in any sense be possible to get a hard resolution through the Security Council which didn't just condemn terrorism, but set up a whole global set of actions to deal with terrorism, and I said the mood is such here that I think you know this is possible, and he said are you sure? Won't there be a reaction from countries that normally watch the United

States very carefully and don't like to give it very much latitude? I said you should sense the mood in New York, the UN has become part of New York city over this, and I think if you're ever going to get something of this nature through, you're going to get it through now, and so he said right, give it a go, and then we learnt that the United States itself was drafting a set of measures, and we decided to see what they were going to propose, because, for once, this is not normally the case. For once the United States proposed something as a body. I say that because I was in the UN at that time.

other is stop those who we don't know are out there, we can't identify, from doing anything like this again, so you go for those you can identify. But you've also got to go for those you can't identify, and to do the second of those, it has to be global, it has to be comprehensive, because even the United States with its great reach cannot just invade another sovereign territory in order to pre-empt terrorist activity that may one day hit them. If they can prove a self defence argument and say that we know that there is this cell in Somalia which doesn't have a government that controls the whole of Somali territory, and they're in there in a vacuum somewhere and nobody's going to deal with them unless we deal with them, and we know they're aimed at us and here is the evidence, then perhaps the UN would understand that that was self defence. But in order to make sure that money is not collected and passed to terrorists, that arms don't reach them, that cells don't talk to each other, that people don't cross borders to feed terrorist cells, to get all that together, you have to get every jurisdiction in the world co-operating, passing legislation that covers this, and getting their capacity up to a new level of effectiveness within their

we look at the next stage of the central authority in Afghanistan, which will renew itself into a different phase under the Bonn agreement in July. We know that, no UN peacekeeping force can look after the security arrangements in Afghanistan as it is at the moment; it's got to be a matter of multi national forces working together with real power and rules of engagement that allow them to fire if necessary. The UN peacekeeping function is really to police agreements between parties that are written down and fully subscribed to and need a more passive peacekeeping observer mission, with some military strength just to make sure that they don't get pushed around, but in the sharper circumstances of Afghanistan, as in the early days when East Timo

was still very Americacentric, which is the nature of most American administrations, and was noticed as such, he wasn't reaching out into some of the other areas where the majority of the UN member states would like to have seen some American action. I don't myself believe in poverty and, and deprivation and world inequalities being the root cause of terrorism, because the wish to murder comes from something else, whether it's murder or whether it's terrorism, to plop over from anger, resentment hatred into we must kill as many people as possible is not a factor of how poor you are, or how much you resent poverty. But the catchment area for that, the area of general support for hitting back at the big rich guys does come from all of that, and I think that the UN system is still looking for a response from the developed world in those areas. Bush gave no sign of that in November speech and that was commented on a little bit also. Nevertheless, he sustained the general area of support for the United States reaction in Afghanistan and the post 11 September reaction.

STOURTON: What happened to the diplomatic climate when he made his axis of evil comments?

GREENSTOCK: Well you've seen some of the comments from Europe and around the world on that, but I think we have to give the American administration credit for having thought this one very carefully through. We all know that it's not literally true that these three countries aren't working together on an axis. They aren't really similar to each other at all; I think the one that the Americans were and are really getting at is Iraq. Iran and, and North Korea are not the same threat at all, the point he was making was that these three countries have got to realise that we're focused on them. They are evil in some of the things that they're doing, and we are not going to stand for it, and it was a deliberate use of a controversial phrase to make people sit up and think, "Blimey, this

STOURTON: What's your verdict on the performance of the United Nations through the crisis, do you think it showed itself up to the task?

GREENSTOCK: Depends how you define the task. I've always been realistic about that. The UN's task was to make a moral judgement on what had happened, which it's very good at, to organise the global response amongst those who weren't going to take a national military response, and to organise the international community's political approach to Afghanistan, which was done exceedingly well through Lakta Brahimi, and the Bonn conference of the Afghan parties in leading up to a decision in December, which we the Brits, I have to say, looking back, were quite impatient about, we wanted them to get a move on you know, do you have to wait until they all come to Bonn, why don't you do something in Kabul to bring these people together, and Brahimi said well hang on, let's get this right you know, a few days here or there getting to the right decision. Brahimi was right, he was right to choose to do it in the way that he did and we acknowledged that after his success. I think the UN were as good on this issue on 11 September and on the rebuilding of Afghanistan as I've seen them in my experience of the UN in say, the last decade.

STOURTON: But in terms of what Kofi Annan said about them being uniquely well placed, that was his phrase, to coordinate the war against terrorism in the longer term, do you think that's realistic?

GREENSTOCK: I don't think he means it literally as a war against terrorism in terms of military or security sector action, but not only is the UN uniquely placed, there's no rival to it, there isn't any other global institution, and I think that what resolution 1373 has done, and what my committee, the counter terrorism committee of the UN security council, is doing, is irreplaceable in terms of global action against terrorism, and that is obliging every member state to contribute to that effort against terrorism, to snuff it out on every territory, because every state is sovereign in its own territory and without their contribution in their jurisdiction, you're going to have vacuums here and vacuums there which terrorism will eventually migrate to. And therefore I do think it's uniquely placed and I think it's indispensable.

STOURTON: Brilliant... thank you very much.